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Martin Fe  ldste  in 
Changes in world politics and in technology have led to an explosive growth of 
international capital flows in recent years, particularly to the emerging market 
countries and to the nations of eastern and central Europe and the former So- 
viet Union. The private market in debt finance, in equity capital, and in direct 
foreign investment has become overwhelmingly larger than current and past 
official capital flows. These capital flows bring the recipient countries substan- 
tial gains by  augmenting local saving and by  improving both technology and 
incentives. But as the experience in Latin America in the early 1980s and in 
Asia in the late 1990s has shown, capital flows can also bring serious problems. 
The political changes that contributed to the surge in capital flows deserve 
emphasis here because they have been largely ignored by economists and are 
not discussed elsewhere in this volume. The end of the cold war and the col- 
lapse of the Soviet Union opened opportunities for investment in a large group 
of  countries that needed capital, management, and technology. The shifting 
political climate in China also made investment in that country more attractive. 
Political change also accounts for the rise in investment in many of the de- 
veloping countries of  Latin America and Asia. Country after country aban- 
doned Marxist ideology and no longer treated capitalist countries as political 
or ideological enemies. In this environment, they welcomed foreign direct in- 
vestment from the industrial countries as well as minority equity investments. 
They privatized  state-owned industries and allowed foreigners to invest in 
these companies. The change in the political climate in these countries also 
made them more attractive to foreign investors who felt more secure about 
lending, making equity investments, and locating operating businesses. 
Modern technology has changed the management of financial transactions 
in ways that have expanded international capital flows. Developments in com- 
puting and communication capability have made it possible to create precisely 
defined international index funds at very low cost. Even individual investors 
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can expand their portfolios to include representative equities or bonds from a 
variety of countries or regions without having to choose particular companies 
or even particular countries. Through mutual funds that sell such index funds, 
investors can invest abroad in relatively small amounts. 
The relevant technological advances involve more than just computing and 
communication. It is also financial technology that has encouraged and in- 
creased the international flow of investment. Derivative markets allow inves- 
tors to separate cross-border equity or interest rate risk from cross-border cur- 
rency risk by hedging the currencies associated with equity or bond positions. 
This hedging may help to explain an important but still inadequately under- 
stood feature of the international capital market: the contrast between the very 
large volume of gross flows and the very small volume of net flows. Despite 
the trillions of dollars of gross flows, most national saving remains in the coun- 
try where it originates.' 
The most obvious contribution of international capital flows to host coun- 
tries is to augment the supply of domestic saving in countries with unusually 
rich investment opportunities. The high marginal product of capital means that 
capital-importing countries can benefit even when the interest rates and the 
equity yields to the foreign providers of capital are high. 
Despite this contribution, it is important to note that the magnitude of the 
capital inflows is still small relative to the volume of domestic saving. Most of 
the investment in plant and equipment and in real estate in every country is 
financed by domestic saving. This reflects the limited size of  current account 
deficits and associated capital inflows that the international capital market will 
support. For example, a country in which business investment and housing 
construction is equal to 20 percent of GDP will have to finance 85 percent of 
that investment with local saving if its current account deficit is not to exceed 
3 percent of GDP. 
Direct foreign investment means much more than additions to the stock of 
capital. It brings with it better technology, modem management, and expanded 
access to global markets. Portfolio equity investments also help in a different 
way  by  exposing local companies to the scrutiny of  the international capital 
markets, requiring greater accounting transparency and more effective corpo- 
rate governance. 
International capital flows also bring advantages to the investors. The com- 
panies that bring direct foreign investment acquire market access, lower cost 
inputs, and opportunities for profitable introduction of more efficient produc- 
tion methods. Portfolio investors typically enjoy higher yields than they would 
in the industrial countries from which the capital comes as well as an opportu- 
nity for risk diversification that can lower the overall risk of the investors' port- 
folios. The potential benefits of  international diversification appear to be so 
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large that financial economists are puzzled by the limited extent to which indi- 
vidual and institutional investors have availed themselves of  this opportunity. 
One explanation for this puzzle may be that investors do not accept the histori- 
cal risk experience as a good guide to future risk. Concern about the political 
risks of  debt defaults or of  tax changes that expropriate equity investments 
may drive investors to seek the comfort of the low-diversification herd instead 
of the opportunity of an optimal investment strategy. The recent experience in 
several Asian countries has involved changes in currency and equity values that 
greatly exceed the historical experience described by the variances of currency 
values and equity prices that are used in optimal portfolio models. When his- 
torical estimates of risk are adjusted to reflect this recent experience, investors 
may well be vindicated in their refusal to accept the implications of portfolio 
theory based on previous historical measures of risk. 
The experience of the past two decades has shown that with international 
capital flows can come substantial risks to both the providers and the recipients 
of those funds. During the 1970s, the banks of the United States and other in- 
dustrial countries recycled OPEC surpluses and their own national savings to 
eager borrowers abroad, particularly in Latin America. Low real interest rates 
and high commodity prices encouraged borrowers to accept more credit and 
expand their activities. But when the U.S. Federal Reserve finally acted deci- 
sively to reduce spiraling double-digit inflation, real dollar interest rates rose 
sharply, reducing economic activity and lowering commodity prices and de- 
mand. The debtor countries of Latin America, led by Mexico in the summer of 
1982, found they could not get the increased credit they needed to pay the high 
interest rates and to offset the shortfall of export earnings. The result was  a 
debt moratorium that engulfed nearly all of the Latin American countries. 
During the rest of the decade, the borrower countries went through a painful 
transition as they lowered domestic consumption in order to reduce their de- 
pendence on imported capital, to pay the high interest rates on their growing 
debts, and to compensate for the decline in exports. The creditor banks that 
had lent to the Latin American countries were also hard hit during this period 
as the loan write-downs impaired bank capital, causing bank regulators to re- 
quire dividend suspensions and other changes in the banks’ activity. Further 
defaults by the borrower countries could have made major commercial banks 
technically insolvent and led to their being closed by  the regulators. 
The Asian problems that began in Thailand in the summer of  1997 are still 
unfolding. Although a full analysis of  the factors that precipitated the wide- 
spread series of  currency crises remains to be done, it is clear that its fixed 
exchange rate regime and chronic current account deficit increased the like- 
lihood of a crisis in Thailand. Other local factors that may have contributed 
to these currency crises include weak financial sectors, rapid increases in real 
estate prices, and inadequate quantities of foreign reserves. The devaluation of 
the Chinese yuan and the sharp fall in the yen-dollar exchange rate added to 
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ers and had pegged their currency values to the dollar when the yen is a more 
relevant currency because of local trade patterns. The spread of the crisis from 
Thailand to Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and other countries reflected a 
mix of  fundamental factors (e.g., devaluation by  one country increased the 
potential trade deficits of the others) and psychological contagion among in- 
vestors who preferred to abandon the region during a period of stress and un- 
certainty. 
The events in Asia have raised a number of important questions that deserve 
careful attention. How can emerging market countries act to reduce the risk of 
future currency and financial crises? When such crises occur, how can they be 
managed to reduce the adverse effects on the domestic economies? And how 
can industrial countries revise their own policies to reduce the risk of  future 
crises in international capital markets? 
These are questions to which the NBER will return in a future research proj- 
ect. I hope that the current volume is both interesting in itself and useful as a 
background for that future research. 
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